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SUMMARY:

vacated~wo
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Petr contends that the CADC erroneously

regulations

i~

promulgated under §210(a) of the

Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act ("PURPA"), as
inconsistent with other provisions of PURPA.
2.

FACTS:

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

("FERC") promulgated a number of rules under authority given it
by §210(a) of PURPA to make rules it determined necessary to

V
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encourage cogeneration and small power production.

\."\

Cogeneration

is the simultaneous production of electricity and usable thermal
energy, such as heat or steam.

Small power production is the use

of biomass, waste, geothermal, or renewable resources to produce

. v.:::

electric power.

. ..

~

Two of these regulations promulgated under

...........-

§210(a) of PURPA are at issue in this case.

Th~

§292.304(b), particularly subsections (2) and (4), relate to the ·
price at which utilities must purchase electricity from

~

\...---?

•

cogeneration facilities and small power production facilities.
For ease of reference, such facilities will be referred to as

.A~ualifying facilitie~.

Section 292.304 (b) (2) and (4), termed the

"full avoided cost rule," provides that a utility must purchase
electricity from qualifying facilities at a rate that equals that
utility's full avoided cost.

~Full

avoided

cos~

is simply a

synonym for the marginal cost a utility would incur if it
obtained electricity from another source, such as by increased
production of power at its own facility.

The~~ule

under attack, S292.303(c) (1), provides that

"any electric utility shall make such interconnections with any
'-/

qualifying facility as may be necessary to accomplish purchases
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[from] and sales [to]" qualifying utilities.

An interconnection

is a pysical connection that permits electricity to flow from one
utility to another.

This rule has been termed the

"interconnection rule."
These regulations have been challenged by resp as
inconsistent with certain provisions of PURPA and the Federal
Power Act ("FPA").

Specifically,

the~ded

to conflict with §210(b) of PURPA.

-

cost rule is said
"'"-""

Section 210(b) of PURPA

provides:
"(b) RATES FOR PURCHASES BY ELECTRIC UTILITIES
"The rules prescribed [by FERC] • • • shall
ensure that, in requiring any electric utility to
offer to purchase electric energy from any
qualifying cogeneration facility or qualifying
small power production facility, the rates for
such purpose-"(1) shall be just and reasonable
to the electric consumers of the electric
utility and in the public interest, and
"(2) shall not discriminate against
qualifying cogenerators or qualifying
small power producers.
"No such rule prescribed • • • shall provide for
a rate which exceeds the incremental cost to the
electric utility of alternative electric energy."

The~terconnection
....

rule is said to undermine §§210 and 212

of the FPA, and thus conflict with §210(e) (3), which expressly
provides that qualifying facilities may not be exempted from
§§210-212 of the FPA.

Section 210 of the FPA gives FERC the

power to order interconnection and make any ancillary orders
necessary to make interconnection effective.

Subsection (a)

provides that such orders may be entered upon the application of
any utility or qualifying facility.

Subsection (b) provides that

-4/

before making such an order FERC issue notice to all affected
parties and provide an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing.
Subsection (c) provides that FERC is only to issue the requested
order if such an order is in the public interest, would either
encourage overall conservation of energy capital, optimize the
efficient use of facilities or resources, or improve the
reliability of any electric utility to which it applies, and
meets the requirements of §212.

Subsection (d) gives FERC the

power to initiate such a proceeding on its own motion.

Section

212 provides that FERC shall not issue an order under §210,
unless it determines that such order will not lead to four
specified harms to the producer of power forced to interconnect
or its customers.
FERC's justification for the rules was provided in FERC
Order No. 69 and its order granting in part and denying in part
rehearing on Orders 69 and 70.

FERC noted that it had initially

proposed that there be a rebuttable presumption that the rate at
which utilities purchased power from qualifying facilities was
acceptable if it reflected full avoided cost.

Because it

received comments that the rule was ambiguous, explained FERC, it
settled upon the challenged rule.

FERC then addressed a number

of comments, including comments of utilities that they and their
ratepayers would be subject to increasing costs of world energy
if the rate they had to pay for power from qualified facilities
was set at full avoided cost.
con, FERC said:

In response to arguments pro and
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"The Commission notes that, in most instances,
if part of the savings from cogeneration and
small power production were allocated among the
utilities' ratepayers, ~n~ rate reductions will
be insi nificant for an 1naividu
tomer. On
tne ot er han , if hese savings are allocated to
the relatively small class of qualifying
cogenerators and small power producers, they may
provide a significant incentive for a higher
growth rate of these technologies." Petn. at B65.
FERC explained that another problem of attempting to split
between qualifying facilities and electricity consumers the
difference between the qualifying facilities costs and that of
alternate sources of energy was that it would have to determine
the costs of qualifying facilities.

"A major portion of

[PURPA]," it explained, "is intended to exempt qualifying
facilities from cost-of-service regulation by which utilities
traditionally have been regulated."
~RC

responded in its rehearing order to the argument that

its interconnection rule contravened S210(e) (3) of PURPA.

FERC

noted that §§210 and 212 grant the right to apply for
interconnection orders, but also impose an obligation or
liability of being subjected to such orders.

Section 210(e) (3)

was meant to prevent FERC from relieving qualifying facilities
from the liabilities of §§210 and 212, it did not make the
sections the exclusive vehicle for the exercise of the privilege
of forcing interconnection.

Such an interpretation is consistent

with the accepted meaning of "exempt" -- "to release or deliver
from some liability or requirement to which others are subject."
The privilege of forcing interconnection is not a liability or a
requirement, while the amenability to an interconnection order is

-6-

such a liability or requirement.

FERC cited no legislative

history for this proposition.
3.

DECISION BELOW:

regulations.

The~C

,,

,.

vacated both of the

It first discussed the full avoided cost rule.

The

court began its discussion by saying that it was holding that
"FERC had not adequately justified its adoption of the full
avoided cost standard."

It noted, quoting a passage from the

Conference Report on PURPA, that the limitation of the price
which utilities could be forced to pay to the utilities' marginal
cost was not meant to supercede the
standard for determining price.

"jus~nd

reasonable"

It then rejected FERC's three

reasons for the full avoided cost rule.

The court said that FERC

had provided no factual basis for the claim that any lowering of
price to utilities would lead to insignificant rate reductions to
utility customers.

FERC's desire to avoid rate setting on the

basis of the qualifying facility's costs could have been served
by setting the price at some percentage of avoidable cost.
Finally, FERC justified its rule by saying that if the price were
set at some percentage of avoidable cost the price would be
insufficient to induce potential qualifying facilities to begin
production.

The court said, however, that "FERC should allocate

the benefits more evenly between [qualifying facilities] and
utilities if the utilities can demonstrate that, under a
percentage of avoided cost approach, an allocation less heavily
favoring the [qualifying facility] is in the public interest and
the interest of utilities' electric consumers, and will not
disproportionately discourage [the production from qualifying

-7facilities]."

The court then set out some concerns that FERC

should consider on remand.

First, full avoided cost might not be

in the public interest because cogeneration and small production
facilities whose cost equal that of utilities may produce more
detrimental effects in such forms as more pollution or less tax
revenues.

Moreover, by reducing the number of kilowatt hours

over which utilities can spread their fixed costs, increased
sales of power by qualifying facilities may raise the per
kilowatt the price of utility-produced power.

The court then

explained that if competitive forces existed in the market for
cogeneration and non-fossil-fuel based power, FERC should take
such forces into account in determining the degree and type of
regulation necessary.

If the market for such power is not

competititve, said the court, FERC may be justified in its
current regulation of the rates charged by utilities.

Even then,

however, it would not be clear that full avoided cost is the
proper rate level.

~

1)

With respect to the interconnection rule, the court also
rejected FERC's arguments.

First, it concluded, contrary to

FERC's suggestion, that forcing qualifying facilities to go
through adversary hearings before being able to force
interconnection would impose an undue burden on such facilities.
FERC, the court concluded, could adopt streamlined procedures for
making the necessary findings under §§210 and 212, and thus
relieve qualifying facilities from the present burdens of the
hearing process.

It dealt with the argument FERC presented in

the rehearing order as follows:

-8-

"Finally, FERC argues that rule 292.303(c) (1)
is consistent with PURPA section 210 (e) (3) if the
latter is interpreted as protecting cogenerators
who are targets of other parties seeking
interconnection, and not extended to situations
where the cogenerator is an applicant for an
interconnection itself. While an interesting and
not inherently implausible suggestion, the
Commission points to no evidence in the
legislative history or the statute itself to
justify this interpretation, which is both
counterintuitive and inconsistent with the
statute's explicit provisions. Nor were we able
to find such evidence. Accordingly, we reject
the interpretation. The Commission's
interconnection rule is hereby vacated." Petn.
at B-24 to B-25 (emphasis in original).

~ERC petitioned for rehearing.

Only five CADC judges

participated in the decision, two of the five dissented from the
denial of rehearing en bane.

The acllssen.ters said that, as they

.

read FERC's orders, FERC had found that the interests set out in
§210(b) of PURPA could best be accommodated by a rate that would
encourage cogeneration without raising rates to consumers.

They

said this determination seemed reasonable, and they expressed
doubt as to whether any further explanation was necessary to
satisfy the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. §706 (2) (A).

With respect to the interconnection rule, the

dissenters said that in rejecting the rule the panel:
"has rejected FERC's alternative interpretation
of the statute that would simply prevent the
Commission from requiring a cogenerator to
interconnect without providing for an evidentiary
hearing. The alternative interpretation is a
plausible one and appears to be more closely in
line with Congress' expressed desire to encourage
cogeneration. This alternative reading should
receive closer scrutiny by this court before it
erects a formidable, perhaps insurmountable,
roadblock to a major energy program." Petn. at
B-208.

~cAPD5 .{j.
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"(

4.

CONTENTIONS:

The SG.

~

~·

With respect to the

interconnection rule, the SG reasserts the argument that FERC
presented in its rehearing order.

The SG also argues that the

decision below frustrates two of Congress' desires.

First, the

decision below will undermine Congress' attempt to encourage
cogeneration and small power production, by requiring a fullscale administrative adjudiction before a utility could be
compelled to purchase electricity from a qualifying utility.
Secondly, by requiring a proceeding before FERC, and thus
rendering invalid FERC rules leaving the resolution of conflicts
over interconnection to state authorities, the CADC has
frustrated Congress' desire to leave the detailed case-by-case
oversight of interconnections to state authorities.
With respect to the full avoided cost rule, while the CADC
claimed to hold only that FERC had offered insufficient
justification for the rule, the CADC's decision indicates that
such a rule cannot be adopted regardless of the justification
that FERC proffers for it.

In any event, since the rate set by

FERC was within the zone of reasonableness, as defined by
Congress when it provided that the price qualifying facilities
could charge could not be set above the utility's marginal cost,
the CADC lacked authority to vacate the rate.
Cases, 390

u.s.

747, 767 (1968).

Permian Basis Rate

The CADC mischaracterized

FERC's rule, since even under the rule many utilities may not
have to pay full avoided cost when the utility purchases power
from a qualifying utility.

Any state may apply for a waiver of

FERC's rule, and qualifying facilities and utilities may

-10negotiate prices that are lower than the full avoided costs.

The

CADC also erred in outlining a host of concerns to be examined on
remand, for by doing so the CADC substituted its judgment for
that of FERC.

Indeed, the CADC seemed to apply a "substantial

evidence" test, rather than an "arbitrary and capricious" test,
when reviewing the two FERC regulations.

Finally, because many

states have adopted regulations in reliance on the "full avoided
cost rule," and because some rule is necessary so that new
qualifying facilities will be certain enough of the price they
can obtain to make investments and obtain capital, the benefits
Congress sought to achieve by PURPA may never be realized if the
decisjon below is not reversed.
/ American Paper Institute ("API")
'~

(Intervenor Below).

The

vacatur of the interconnection rule will have a devastating
impact on the cogeneration and small power production industries.
Qualifying facilities cannot find a market for their power unless
they can promptly obtain interconnections.

Cogenerators and

small power producers, faced with the obstacle of having to fight
utilities in an adversary context (in which the utilities have a
wealth of experience and numerous opportunities for delay) before
they can obtain needed interconnections, will simply not go
forward with production.
policies underlying PURPA.

Such a result would undercut the
Moreover, by rejecting FERC's

conclusion that S210(e) (3) only subjected qualifying utilities
interconnection orders, the court rejected a reasonable
interpretation of S210(e) (3).

The court thus ignored the rule

that an agency interpretation of a statute should be honored if
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it is not clearly wrong.

The maxim

c~rries

special weight when

the challenged interpretation is a contemporaneous construction
of new legislation.
The vacatur of the full avoided cost rule will also have a
devastating impact.

Owners of potential qualifying facilities

cannot make any of the decisions they need to make to begin or
continue production because they have no way of estimating the
revenue streams that their projects can be expected to generate.
The uncertainty cast upon this important federal program by the
decision below makes this case a particularly compelling one for
review by this Court.

(API then repeats the argument in the SG's

brief that the FERC rule was examined under too exacting a
standard of review.)
Respondent.

The vacatur of the full avoided cost rule does

not merit review.

The court simply said that the adoption of the

rule was ill-considered, and indeed "the Court of Appeals
exercised circumspection and restraint, finding that the
Commission appears not to have adhered to the statutory commands,
but giving it the opportunity to adopt the same rule on remand if
it can present a cogent justification of its rule in light of
statutory instructions."

The decision below was right.

set was not "just and reasonable."

The rate

The "just and reasonable"

standard requires a balancing of the interest of the parties.

By

setting a maximum, Congress did not intend to set a zone of
reasonableness.

The argument that the actual rates may be lower

than the rates set by FERC is a post hoc rationalization of the
rate FERC adopted.

Moreover, the state's ability to request

-12waiver of FERC regulations does not really help the customers of
the utility, since they cannot initiate such a request, and the
fact that qualified facilities may not demand the full rate to
which they are entitled cannot save an unreasonable and unjust
rate.

Finally, any uncertainty or delay occasioned by the rule

below is unfortunate, but they are the result of FERC's failure
to promulgate a lawful rule in a timely manner.
The vacatur of the interconnection rule presents no
certworthy issue.

The court below found that the rule violated

the plain meaning of the statute.

The argument that the CADC's

interpretation of the statute frustrates congressional purposes
is mistaken for two reasons.

First, it ignores the powerful

federal interest, furthered by §§210 and 212 of the FPA, in
assuring that interconnections are safe and reliable.

Second, it

makes statutory hearing procedures seem onerous when such
procedures could, given FERC's powers to restrict the opportunity
for a hearing to those cases in which a party meets the threshold
requirements established by an agency, be simple and
unburdensome.
Resp Elizabethtown Gas Co.

Elizabethtown Gas Co. supports

the petition, but adds nothing new.
5.

DISCUSSION:

seems certworthy.

Thev;alidity of the "interconnection rule"

FERC's interpretation of §210(e) (3) of PURPA

as permitting interconnection orders in the absence of a hearing
and the determinations required by §§210 and 212 of the FPA seems
reasonable.

The~ADC

decision requiring some FERC determination

under §§210 and 212 of the FPA may well make it difficult for

-13qualified utilities to obtain interconnection with utilities.
Such a ruling might make obtaining interconnection difficult for
cogenerators and small power producers, and reestablish the
bottleneck Congress tried to break by passing PURPA.

(It is

possible, however, that FERC could break this bottleneck by
adopting streamlined procedures.)
~

The vacatur of the full avoidable cost rule is probably not
worthy of cert.

The CADC has not conclusively said that such a

rule cannot be adopted.

Moreover, even if ultimately FERC will

only be able to promulgate a rule that allows the rate to a
qualifying utility to range between 80% to 100% of avoidable cost
(a possible rule suggested by the CADC panel), the policies
Congress sought to further by passing PURPA will probably not be
gravely damaged.

~

I do note, however, that the CADC's decision

does make it difficult for FERC to justify a full avoidable cost
rule, and thus if such a rule is indeed crucial to the success of
PURPA the vacatur of the full avoidable cost rule should probably
be reviewed.
I recommend a grant limited to the validity of the vacatur
of the interconnection rule.
There is a response covering Nos. 82-226 and 82-34 in No.
82-226.

There is an additional response in No. 82-34.

September 28, 1982

ME

Bell

Opinion in
Appendix
to Petition
in No. 82-34

Preliminary Memo

October 8, 1982 Conference
List 1, Sheet 2

c::::::&·

82-2fG

~

FEDERAL
ENERGY
REGULATORY
COMMISSION

Timely

v.
AMERICAN
ELECTRIC
POWER
SERVICE
CORPORATION,
et al.

--

Cert to CADC
(Robinson,
Wilkey
& Ginsburg)
Federal/Civil

Please see Preliminary Memo in No. 82-34, American Paper
Institute, Inc. v. American Electric Power Service Corporation,
et al., October 8, 1982 Conference (List 1, Sheet 2).
There is a response.
September 28, 1982

ME

Bell

Opinion
in Appendix
to Petition
in No. 82-34

I

.

'

'

..

.

':.:...

October 8, 1982
CO'Urt

·voted on .................. , 19 .. .

Argued ................... , 19 . . .

Assigned .................. , 19 .. .

Submitted ................ , 19 .. .

Announced ................ , 19 .. .

'

No.

82-226

FERC

VB.

AM. ELEC. POWER

HOLD
FOR

CERT.
G

D

JURISDICTIONAL
STATEME NT
N

POST

DI S

AFF

MERITS
REV

Burger, Ch. J ................ .
Brennan, J ................... .
White, J ..................... .
Marshall, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .
Blackmun, J ................. .

. ......... '1)" .... . . . .

Powell, J .................... .

··········~ -~~-

Rehnquist, J ................. .
Stevens, J ........................... .
O'Connor, J .......................... .

AFF

MOTION
G

D

ABSENT

NOT VOTI NG

October 8, 1982
Court

..... .... , 19
19 ...
.. ·
rgued · · · · · · · · · ·
Submitted ......... . . .... .,
A

........ . . . . ., 19.
19 ...
"Voted on.·:··
··
A
...........
,
ssigned · · · · · · ·
19 . . ·
Announced ......... . .... ..'

82-34
No.

AM. PAPER INST I TUTE

vs.
AM. ELEC. POWER

NOT VOTI NG

Burger, Ch. J ...... . .. .
Brennan, J ................. .
Wh ite, J. · · · · · · · · · · · · . .. .

.

Marshall, J · · · · · · · · · · . . . . . .. ..
Blackmun, J · · · · · · · · ...... .
Powell, J ............. . .

..

~

Rehnquist, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Stevens, J .. ········ ·····
O'Connor, J · · · · · · · · · · ... ....

. . . . ................

drk 10/13/82

To: Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Rives

Re: Disqualification When a Trade Association is a Party

Canon 3C (1) (c) of the Code of Judicial Ethics provides
that a judge should disqualify himself when his impartiality might
be questioned because "he knows that .•. he has a financial interest
in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the
proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially
affected by the outcome of the proceeding."

Advisory Opinion No. 49

addresses the question of whether a judge's financial interest in a
member of a trade association requires disqualification.

It adopts

the position advanced by Professor Thode in his Notes to the ABA
Code of Judicial Conduct and distinguishes between direct financial
ownership and indirect or technical ownership.

It determines that

owning stock in a member of a trade association, like owning a
policy in a mutual insurance company, is an indirect financial
interest that does not require disqualification.
The Opinion concludes:
Accordingly, the Committee sees no impropriety in a judge
serving in a proceeding where a trade association appears
as a party, even though the judge owns a small percentage
of the publicly-traded shares of one or more members of
the association, subject, of course, to the general
qualifications set forth in sections 3C (1) (c) and 3C (3) (c)
of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Supreme Oourt of the United States
Memorandum
------------------------------------------------------------, 19 ----------

'

r
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The Opinion expressly qualifies its approval by referring
to sections 3C {1) {c) and 3C {3) (c), which provide for
disqualification when a judge has any interest that could be
substantially affected by the proceedings.

It would seem that if a

ruling had the possibility of materially affecting the economic
health of an industry represented by a trade association, an
interest in a member of the industry might require disqualification.
A review of the cases under 28

u.s.c.

§455 indicates that

no court has decided the question of whether owning stock in a
member of a trade association requires disqualification.

.:%ttttrtmt <!j:ttttrl cf ±4t 11htittb .:§tdt,tr
~ a.s-Jrhtgtcn, ~. <q:. 20&iJ1. ~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR

October 14, 1982

No. 82-34

American Paper Institute v. American
Electric Power Service Corp.
No. 82-226 FERC v. American Electric Power
Service Corp.

Dear Chief,
Based on Lewis' memo of October 14 and the
opinion of the Advisory Committee on Judicial Activities
concerning stock ownership in a member of a trade
association when only the trade association is a party,
I plan to participate in the referenced cases. You
may disregard my previous expression of recusal.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice

cc:

Justice Powell
Alexander L. Stevas

October 14, 1982
8 2-34 Amer i.cart Paper Institute v. A.mer ican lUectr ic Power

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
This refers to our discussion last Friday as to
disqualification where one owns stock in a company that is a
member of a trade association where only the trade
association is a party.
This question has been answered by the Advisory
Committee on Judicial Activities. I f\nclose a copy of its
Opinion No. 49 dated ,June 9, 1q77. This was reaffirmed in
Opinion No. 62 in 1979.
Although these opinions refer to provisions of the
Code of Judicial Connuct, th~ federal statute, ?.8 u.s.~.
§455, tracks the Code in the relevant language.
~he petitioner in this case, Arnerican Paper
Institute, is said to have 164 members. Our family and
trusts own stock in one of the listed members. Two other
companies in which we have an i.nterest have "affiliates" or
subsidiaries listed among the members of the petitioner. I
personally represented the two parent corporations and would
remain out if their subsidiaries w~re parties without regard
to stock interest.

I have not heretofore recused simply bec~use of
intereet in a member of a trade association where only the
association is the ~arty. I suppose there are situations
where the case is of such considerable importance to an
entire industry that arguably its outcome could have some
effect even on one's ownership of a small fractional
interest in a company's listed and publicly tradeif shares.
I think the ruling of the Advisory Committee is
correct, as it is unlikely there was any intent to extend
"recusal" this far. A judge's ownership in a mutual or
"common investment fund" presents a stronger case for
recusal, and it is expressly excepted in Canon 3C(3) (c).

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

. ,.

~1arch

U, 1983

A2-34 American Paper Institute v.

Am~rican

Electric Power Service Corp.
82-226 FERC v. American Electric Power Service Corp.

near r'hief:
It now appears necessar.v for me to remain out of
the above cases.
Petitioner's brief, file~ December 2 and that I
looked at this morninq for the first time, is signed by
counsel for several companies, incl,HHnq a company in 'i'7hich
Jo and a trust for her benefit hol~ stock.
When we considered certiorari on these cases, T
mentioned at Conference the fact that amonq the 164 members
of the American Paper Insti.tute (a trade association) were a
couple of former clients in which we also held stock. There
are opinions of the Ethics Committee to the effect that this
would not require disqualifi.cation. See my letter to the
Conference of October 14. Although I passen at the Conference, I then thouqht I was free to participate.
The counsel whose name now appears on the brief
for petitioner was not listed as counsel on the petition for
certiorari.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

